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4.1  Introduction 
In  social microexperiments,  the experimenter assigns treatments and 
gauges responses at the individual level. The response of each individual 
is assumed to be independent and small in comparison to the market or 
social system. 
In social macroexperiments, treatments  are assigned at the group, 
community, or market level. The responses of  entire social units, as well 
as of  individuals within each unit, are the objects of  interest. The re- 
sponses of  the individuals within each unit are correlated (Rivlin 1974; 
Mosteller and Mosteller 1979). 
Economists and other social scientists have spent disproportionately 
too much effort on the design and interpretation of  microexperiments. 
The potential value and limitations of macroexperiments have not been 
adequately characterized. Accordingly, we need to develop a new science 
of  macroexperimental design and to articulate more carefully the trade- 
off  between micro and macro designs as guides to public policy. 
My  argument is framed within the context of  health-policy experi- 
ments. I concentrate on two policy issues: the effect of changes in health- 
insurance coverage on the demand for medical care and the effect of 
life-style intervention on the risk of  coronary heart disease (CHD). 
In section 4.2, I point out several problems in the design, implementa- 
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tion, and interpretation of  health-policy  microexperiments. These in- 
clude subject selection and attrition, anticipatory responses, Hawthorne 
effects, and ethical constraints on individual randomization. Although 
the results of  microexperiments may elucidate certain mechanisms of 
individual behavior, they may not reveal the total, market equilibrium 
effects of policy alternatives. 
Section 4.3 considers how macroexperiments may resolve these micro- 
experimental difficulties. Because macroexperimentation can be less in- 
trusive  upon individuals,  these experiments  may  avoid the potential 
selection and attrition biases, Hawthorne effects, and ethical constraints 
characteristic of  microexperiments. Most important, macroexperiments 
can be more useful  for evaluating  the total market and social-system 
effects of policy options. 
In section 4.4, I discuss two serious limitations of macroexperimenta- 
tion. First, intervention at the market or community level reduces the 
statistical power  of  the experiment  and, in  some cases, threatens its 
external  validity. Second,  the macroexperimenter may encounter signifi- 
cant political and administrative obstacles to randomization. 
Section  4.5  considers how  these  defects  of  macroexperimentation 
might be avoided. Decentralization  of  rnacroexperiments, along with 
experimental blocking, is suggested as a means of  improving statistical 
power and overcoming administrative barriers to randomization. Time- 
series experiments, crossover designs, as well as mixtures of micro and 
macro designs, are considered. To  resolve questions of external validity, I 
show how the results of different macroexperiments might be combined. 
Throughout the analysis, I focus on the experience of two microexperi- 
ments-the  Rand Health Insurance  Study  (Newhouse 1974) and the 
Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial (Multiple Risk Factor Interven- 
tion Trial Group 1976a, 1976b)-and  one macroexperiment-the  Stan- 
ford Heart Disease Prevention Program (Farquhar 1978). Several other 
macro-experiments  in  life-style intervention  are in progress or under 
consideration.’ But no bona fide macroexperiment in health insurance or 
in medical-care utilization has been undertaken. One goal of  section 4.5 
is to suggest how such experiments might be executed. 
This paper is not a broad endorsement of  macroexperimentation for 
health policy. It does not advocate the abandonment of  microexperi- 
ments.  Nor do I  envisage  a  strict  choice  between  micro  and macro 
designs. But in many cases, precise microestimates of  only one or two 
1. These are the Stanford Five-City Project  (Hulley and Fortmann  1980); the North 
Karelia Project (Puska et al. 1978); the Minnesota Heart Health Program; the Pawtucket 
Heart Health Program; the European Collaborative Heart Disease  Prevention  Project 
(WHO European Collaborative  Group 1974; Rose et al.  1980); and the  Pennsylvania 
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parameters of  a problem do not justify our plunging into full-scale poli- 
cies. Less precise macroassessments of  the total impact of  contemplated 
policies may then be warranted. 
4.2  Problems with Microexperiments 
policy. 
4.2.1  The Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial (MRFIT) 
Epidemiologists have repeatedly shown that high blood pressure, ele- 
vated blood cholesterol, and cigarette smoking are independent, power- 
ful predictors  of  an individual’s risk  of  fatal  and nonfatal  events of 
coronary heart disease (Truett, Cornfield, and Kannel 1967). Men and 
women who spontaneously quit smoking incur a lower risk of subsequent 
coronary events than continuing smokers (Friedman et al. 1981). These 
findings have been derived from the natural histories of  various study 
populations (for example, residents of Framingham, Massachusetts). To 
assess the causal nature of such predictive relationships, and to gauge the 
reversibility of  the disease process, it would be logical to attempt to 
reverse each of  the above risk factors in a randomized experiment. 
Separate clinical trials have been instituted to lower blood cholesterol, 
to treat hypertension, and to induce smoking cessation (Davis and Havlik 
1977; Hypertension  Detection  and  Follow-up Program  Cooperative 
Group 1979a, 1979b; Rose and Hamilton 1978). The difficulty with such 
single-factor experiments is that participation in the trial is a total experi- 
ence (Syme 1978). An experiment may be designed to test the isolated 
effect to lowering blood pressure. But when subjects are instructed to 
take antihypertensive medications, and possibly to restrict salt and ca- 
loric intake and increase physical activity, they inevitably modify dietary 
fat intake, smoking, and other aspects of  behavior. 
The Multiple  Risk  Factor  Intervention  Trial  (Kuller  et  al.  1980; 
MRFIT Group 1976a, 1976b, 1977; Sherwin, Sexton, and Dischinger 
1979) recognized this limitation of  single-factor trials. The protocol was 
designed to test the hypothesis that lowering serum cholesterol by diet, 
reducing high blood pressure by diet and drugs, and cessation of cigarette 
smoking, in combination, would result in a reduced risk of  death from 
CHD. Men aged thirty-five to fifty-seven, who displayed various com- 
binations of cigarette smoking, elevated blood pressure, and cholesterol, 
but who displayed no initial evidence of CHD, were to be followed for six 
years. After initial screening of 361,661 subjects during 1974-76,  a total 
of  12,866 subjects were randomly assigned either to a program of special 
intervention  (SI) directed toward  these risk factors or to their usual 
source of  medical care (UC). The experiment is being conducted at 
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MRFIT clinics in twenty-two sites across the country and is scheduled for 
completion in early 1982. 
4.2.2  The Rand Health Insurance Study (HIS) 
The responsiveness of  medical-care demand to price is an important 
factor in the design of health insurance and the control of rising medical 
expenditures. Price elasticities of demand for medical services have been 
estimated from a variety of  data sources. But the main source of  price 
variation in these nonexperimental data is the terms of  insurance cover- 
age. Since consumers select their insurance on the basis of health status, 
income, family composition, and other factors affecting demand, such 
estimates could be seriously misleading. 
The Rand Health Insurance Study (Manning et al.  1981; Manning, 
Newhouse, and Ware 1982; Morris 1979; Morris, Newhouse, and Archi- 
bald 1980; Newhouse 1974; Newhouse et al. 1979) was designed to over 
come this limitation.  A sample of  approximately 8,000 individuals in 
2,823 families was enrolled in six sites across the country. Families were 
enrolled in one of fourteen different HIS insurance plans for either three 
or five years. These plans ranged from free care, to 95 percent coinsur- 
ance below a maximum dollar expenditure, to assignment in a prepaid 
group practice. Low-income families were over sampled. Persons eligible 
for Medicare, heads of households sixty-one years of age and older at the 
time of  enrollment, members of  the military, and the institutionalized 
population were excluded. Enrollment of  subjects at the Dayton, Ohio 
site was completed in 1975,  while enrollment at the Georgetown County, 
South Carolina site was completed in 1979. In addition to analysis of the 
effects  of  various insurance plans on medical care demand, the effects of 
coverage on health status (Brook et al. 1979; Ware et al. 1980), certain 
administrative aspects of  health insurance, and the effects of HMO care 
are under study. 
Both MRFIT and HIS can be legitimately called second-generation 
social experiments. Their designers took advantage of considerable prior 
experience in  clinical trials and social experimentation. Nevertheless, 
these microexperiments exhibit important difficulties in design, execu- 
tion, and interpretation. These difficulties will now be considered. 
4.2.3  Subject Selection and Other Pre-Experimental Biases 
In MRFIT, subjects were initially screened, primarily at work sites, by 
a series of medical examinations (Kuller et al. 1980). Those eligible at the 
first screening on the basis of blood pressure, cholesterol, and smoking 
habits were invited to a second, more detailed medical screening, at 
which time the purpose and duration of the study were explained. For 
those who returned for the third and final screening, informed consent 
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aimed at men with high CHD risk, and since the experiment could not be 
blinded, potential subjects were necessarily informed of  their medical 
status during the screening process. 
It is reasonable to suspect that the initial volunteers in this experiment 
were highly motivated and therefore more susceptible to intervention 
than the general population. Of  those subjects initially eligible by risk- 
factor criteria, about 30 percent declined to participate. Some of  them 
merely refused to consider quitting smoking. It is also hard to imagine 
that the screening process itself had little effect on subjects’ behavior and 
attitudes. Among those subjects who were ultimately randomized, mean 
diastolic blood pressure declined by about lOmm Hg from the first to the 
final screening examination, while the fraction of  smokers declined by 
about 5 percent. Comparable changes were observed in blood choles- 
terol. These results may reflect changes in measurement methods be- 
tween screening exams or statistical regression to the mean. Neverthe- 
less, the evidence suggests that the pre-experimental phase constituted a 
form of  life-style intervention. 
The planners of MRFIT screened for subjects with high CHD risks in 
order to increase the statistical power of the experiment (MRFIT Group 
1977).’  But this practice is not without its problems.  Blood pressure, 
cholesterol, and smoking are undoubtedly influenced by such factors as 
diet,  stress,  physical  activity,  socioeconomic status,  family  history, 
occupation, and peer pressure, many of  which are difficult to measure. 
These additional, unmeasured variables also affect how subjects’ CHD 
rates respond to experimental intervention. Pre-experimental screening 
on the basis of blood pressure, cholesterol, and smoking can produce a 
population of subjects that is highly unrepresentative with respect to the 
unmeasured variables.  Some men  who  qualify for this study will  be 
former  quitters who  have returned  to the habit  as a result  of, say, 
transient job-related stress. Others will be light smokers who have tran- 
sient elevations in blood pressure due to, say, excessive salt use or weight 
gain. Still others will be inveterate heavy smokers. Although the experi- 
ment  would  still yield  an unbiased  estimate of  the effect of  special 
intervention among those patients who qualified, it is not clear how the 
estimated experimental effect relates to the overall population response. 
This difficulty applies not only to experimental responses in risk factors, 
but also to the effect of intervention on CHD  incidence. It is compounded 
further if  the additional, unmeasured variables affect subject attrition 
during the experiment. 
2. Selection was actually based on “modifiable risk,” which is not necessarily synony- 
mous with “high risk.” This modifiable-risk score was based on a multiple logistic model of 
CHD risk, estimated  from the Framingham study  data  (Truett, Cornfield, and Kannel 
1967), in combination with educated guesses about differential success rates in reducing risk 
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In the Health Insurance Study, the experimenters randomly sampled 
dwelling units and conducted initial interviews in order to ascertain the 
occupants’ ages,  incomes,  and other  data pertinent  to eligibility. A 
base-line interview was administered to eligible families in order to elicit 
information about prior insurance status. Following verification of  the 
insurance information, families were selected, assigned to the various 
plans, and contacted for an enrollment interview (Newhouse 1974; Mor- 
ris 1979; Morris, Newhouse, and Archibald 1980). If  the assigned plan 
represented less extensive insurance than the subjects had prior to entry, 
then the experimenters offered them a compensating incentive payment, 
in fixed installments, but unconditional upon subsequent medical-care 
consumption. Consent to participate in the study was elicited after these 
steps had been taken. Among families who completed base-line inter- 
views and were assigned to treatments, 11 percent refused the enrollment 
interview. Of those who agreed to the enrollment interview, 27 percent 
refused the offer to enroll. 
The HIS incentive payment scheme was intended to ensure that sub- 
jects in all treatment groups were no worse off financially by participating 
in the experiment. At worst, such payments were supposed to have a 
small income effect on demand. Nevertheless, with refusal rates in excess 
of  25 percent, it is worth inquiring whether prior assignment to a plan 
could have affected the decision to participate in the experiment. Those 
families assigned to the high coinsurance plans were more likely to 
receive incentive payments. In these families, the decision to participate 
should depend more heavily upon attitudes toward risk, expectations 
about subsequent health-care utilization, and other unmeasured vari- 
ables. In fact, families  who expect to  make substantial use of medical care 
will be more likely to refuse to participate in the high coinsurance plans. 
It is at least  arguable that  these phenomena will  result in  an overly 
optimistic estimate of the effect of cost sharing on the medical-care use. 
In both MRFIT and HIS, data have been collected on the characteris- 
tics of  those  subjects who refused  to participate  at  the various pre- 
experimental stages, at least beyond the initial screening. It may thus be 
possible to assess some of the determinants of the decision to participate 
and to correct for potential nonparticipation biases. But the determinants 
of  the decision to participate,  it  must  be  recognized,  are not  easily 
measured. So  long as such intangibles play an important role, potential 
nonparticipation biases cannot be completely excluded. Moreover, re- 
plenishment of  nonparticipants on the basis of  observed characteristics, 
as  suggested by  Morris, Newhouse,  and Archibald  (1980), could be 
inappropriate. 
4.2.4  Subject-Attrition Biases 
Since MRFIT and  HIS are still in  progress,  little information  on 
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three-year cumulative attrition rates for the free and nonfree plans have 
been 4 percent and 8 percent, respectively. In the MRFIT experiment, 
vital status has thus far been ascertainable for almost all of  the partici- 
pants. But the ascertainment of other morbid end points, such as nonfatal 
heart attacks, has been more difficult. Detection of these morbid events 
(by evidence on periodic electrocardiograms) required that subjects re- 
turn for repeated checkups and examinations. At the end of the second 
year of  the study, 6 percent of  the special-intervention group and 7.2 
percent of  the usual-care group had missed their annual examinations. 
These proportions were 8 and 9 percent, respectively, by the fourth year. 
Among the SI participants,  16.3 percent had missed their biannual in- 
terim visits by the fourth year. The extent to which nonreporting subjects 
experienced a higher incidence of  nonfatal morbid events is unclear. 
It must be emphasized that subject attrition does not merely erode the 
statistical power of  an experiment. Those who drop out may be least 
susceptible to the contemplated intervention. Certain imperfect covari- 
ates of  the decision to drop out can be measured. But any attempt to 
correct for unmeasured determinants requires a model of the distribution 
of these determinants. The interpretation of the experimental effect may 
then be very sensitive to unverifiable assumptions about the parametric 
form of such a model (Harris 1982; Hausman and Wise, chap. 5 of  this 
volume). In microexperiments, the only foolproof remedy for attrition 
bias is to keep subjects from dropping out altogether. 
4.2.5 
The subject’s knowledge of  his treatment assignment raises some se- 
rious problems  for the MRFIT experiment. Although  the usual-care 
subject does not receive the benefits of  group sessions, counseling, be- 
havioral therapy, and dietary instruction, he and his physician are in- 
formed of his risk status. Moreover, subjects in the UC group are asked, 
as in the SI group, to return for periodic visits and examinations. Highly 
motivated subjects who consent to randomization, but who end up in the 
UC group, may nevertheless alter their behavior. This phenomenon will 
reduce the contrast between UC and SI interventions and diminish the 
power of the experiment. 
Preliminary reports from MRFIT (Sherwin, Sexton, and Dischinger 
1979; Kuller et al. 1980; Schoenberger 1981) in fact show improvements 
in risk-factor scores for both SI and UC groups. After four years, SI men 
exhibited an 11 mm Hg drop in diastolic blood pressure, a 19 mg/dl drop 
in serum cholesterol, and a 41 percent smoking-cessation rate. UC men 
showed a 6 mm Hg drop in diastolic blood pressure, an 11 mg/dl drop in 
serum cholesterol, and a 23 percent smoking-cessation rate. Among SI 
men, 56 percent were being treated with antihypertensive drugs, com- 
pared to 41 percent in the UC group. These improvements could reflect 
further regression toward the mean or trends in behavior independent of 
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the experiment. But the motivating effect of  the experiment itself can 
hardly be excluded. 
MRFIT experimenters recognize that many years may be required 
before the observed changes in risk factors are manifested in reduced 
CHD rates. In that case, the long-term mortality results will hinge criti- 
cally on subjects’ behavior  after the termination  of  formal life-style 
intervention. Perhaps the UC men, who received dramatic attention only 
in the pre-experimental period and who were forced to take responsibility 
for their behavior from the start, will display greater long-run improve- 
ments. By contrast, if  SI subjects become dependent upon the experi- 
ment itself, then discontinuation of  formal intervention could lead to 
higher relapse rates (Syme 1978). 
The planners of  the HIS have made special efforts to detect instru- 
mentation artifacts and anticipatory responses (Newhouse et al. 1979). 
Participants’ incentives to file insurance claims might depend on the 
amount of  reimbursement. Hence, the plan assigment could affect sub- 
jects, reporting of  medical-care utilization.  To avoid this interaction 
between treatment and measurement of  response, a system of  weekly 
reminders to file claims was used. But the reminders themselves were also 
found to affect reporting. Therefore, a subexperiment involving biweekly 
probes was instituted. Since intrusive questionnaires and health reports 
could also affect subject desires to seek medical care, the sequence of 
examinations was similarly varied in a subexperiment. For the prepaid- 
care group, moreover, a set of “controls on controls” was employed, with 
no instrumentation at all. To ascertain whether certain subjects would 
earmark the incentive payments solely for medical care, the schedule of 
incentive payments  and bonuses was  also varied.  In  order to detect 
possible anticipatory responses to the beginning and end of the study, the 
experimenters plan to follow the three-year intervention group for an 
additional two years. They also plan to be watchful of  initial declines in 
price elasticity after the onset of the experiment, followed by increases in 
price sensitivity as the end of  the experiment approaches, followed by 
postexperimental responses to intraexperimental price changes (Arrow 
1975). 
It is difficult at this stage to see how all these instrumentation and 
anticipation artifacts can be estimated precisely. The issue here is not so 
much the separate, main effect of  each form of instrumentation, but its 
interaction with treatment effects. There are too many interactions of 
instrumentation, treatment, and subject anticipation to test all of  them 
satisfactorily. It is not completely clear how information on such artifacts 
can be easily incorporated into the final results. 
4.2.6  Ethical Constraints 
In the Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial, ethical considerations 
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Hg be  excluded from  the study.  Unfortunately, this form of  sample 
truncation leads to difficulties similar to those encountered at the other 
end of  the  risk-factor  scale. Thus, those  individuals with previously 
undetected, severe hypertension may be derived from a population least 
motivated to seek routine care. These persons may have life-styles or 
other unmeasured characteristics that counteract or reduce any salutory 
effects of  risk-factor reduction. 
Even if  a high-risk subject is eligible by  screening criteria, ethical 
considerations  dictate that  treatment  cannot be  completely withheld. 
Hence, MRFIT does  not  compare  treatment  and nontreatment, but 
intensive intervention with  “usual care.” The usual care is  not even 
average care, since the men randomized to the UC group have already 
undergone pre-experimental “treatment.” Moreover, the planners of the 
experiment felt compelled to tell UC subjects that they were at high risk, 
including which risk factors were implicated (Kuller et al. 1980). 
4.2.7  Interpretation of  Treatment Effects 
The design of  MRFIT explicitly recognizes that people do not change 
their CHD risk factors one at a time. But its interpretation is still compli- 
cated by concomitant changes in dimensions of  behavior other than the 
three risk factors. Subjects who are asked to change the saturated-fat 
content of  their diet may also be influenced to increase their physical 
activity, which  may  in turn  affect cardiac status. Men involved in  a 
smoking-cessation group may alter their responses to stress, which could 
in turn affect cholesterol levels. Among SI subjects, in fact, nonsmokers 
and men who had quit smoking had the greatest improvements in serum 
cholesterol (Kuller et al. 1980, table 8). This makes it difficult to assess 
whether the effect of intervention resulted from changes in diet, serum- 
cholesterol  levels,  or other  factors  (Syme  1978). Furthermore,  the 
methods  of  life-style intervention  may  vary  considerably across the 
twenty-two clinical centers in MRFIT. Within a specific MRFIT clinic, 
treatments are further adapted to the idiosyncracies of the experimental 
subject. Even if  we regard special intervention as a homogeneous entity, 
usual care remains ill defined. In the final analysis, if  CHD rates improve 
with intervention in MRFIT, it may be difficult to know exactly what was 
responsible. 
To be  sure, one might attempt  to elucidate  the details of  the ex- 
perimental  effect by  specifying a response  model.  Thus, the Health 
Insurance Study was designed to estimate contrasts between the effects of 
different plans (e.g., the 95 percent coinsurance group versus the free- 
care group, or the prepaid-care group versus the  remaining fee-for- 
service groups). But as early HIS data came in, the experimenters found 
the distribution of  health-care expenditures to be highly asymmetric, with 
a discrete atom at zero expenditures and a fat right-hand tail (Manning et 
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tests of  treatment effects, they therefore proposed a multiple-stage re- 
sponse model, involving the  decision to seek care and expenditures 
conditional upon that decision. In addition to expenditures, health status 
was considered an important outcome measure. But health status could 
be both  a determinant and a consequence of  medical-care utilization 
(Brook et al.  1979; Ware  et al.  1980). These considerations led the 
experimenters to some interesting, but even more complicated structural 
models of  the experimental response. No doubt with further structural 
specifications, price elasticities and the parameters of  response to de- 
ductibles and exclusions might also be estimated. I do not wish to deni- 
grate these sophisticated efforts, but it should be pointed out that the 
conclusions derived from detailed-response surface models may be very 
sensitive to the structural specification  assumed by the analyst. As discus- 
sed in several other papers in this volume, such models are far removed 
from the classical ideal of  the one-way analysis of  variance. 
4.2.8  Relevance of  the Results to Policy Options 
Even if  MRFIT clearly demonstrates a reduction in  CHD risk, its 
special intervention does not necessarily correspond to a viable policy 
option. For one thing, widespread intervention at the individual level is 
expensive. Although employment-based health  and  fitness programs 
have  become more prevalent,  they  may  be  quite  different from the 
specialized  research  environments  of  the  MRFIT  clinical  centers. 
Moreover, changes in life-style are likely to involve social learning, the 
diffusion of  information, the changing of  norms, and other phenomena 
that render individuals’ responses interdependent.  It is not clear that 
MRFIT captures these phenomena (Farquhar 1978; Kasl 1978; Syme 
1978). Finally, such microexperiments reveal little about the effects of 
mobilizing voluntary health agencies, public restrictions on smoking, or 
the use of the mass media. Thus, MRFIT may reveal that CHD rates can 
be reversed. It may also offer some confirmation of the causal effects of 
risk factors. But it will offer much less information on the magnitudes of 
treatment effects in the general population. We could still be far from an 
operational public policy for preventing coronary heart disease. 
The Health Insurance Study was designed primarily to be a demand 
experiment. Except for comparative analysis of  responses at sites with 
different supply conditions, no attempt was made to assess the supply 
response  to an insurance-induced increase in  demand. Nor were the 
market-equilibrium effects of changes in coverage at issue. Yet the supply 
response to changes in insurance coverage is a critical factor in the recent 
rapid rise of  health-care expenditures in this country (Feldstein 1977; 
Harris  1979, 1980; Newhouse  1978). Even  after the HIS results are 
complete, policy makers contemplating changes in insurance coverage 
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behavior,  the  consequences  of  insurance  subsidy  for  technological 
change, or the effect of extensive insurance on competitive-market disci- 
pline. 
The HIS, to be sure, focuses to a great extent on ambulatory-care 
demand. If  the supply of  ambulatory care were relatively elastic, and if 
the supply response of  the ambulatory-care sector were independent of 
the remainder of  the health-care sector, then the results of  the experi- 
ment may offer a more complete picture of the ambulatory-care market 
response. Even so, the behavior of the elderly population, who consume 
a substantial and growing fraction of health-care costs, is not assessed in 
HIS. The decision to exclude the Medicare-eligible population from HIS 
was  based  on  practical  concerns  about  pre-experimental  and  ex- 
perimental logistics. And a case can be made that experiment on elderly 
responses to insurance ought to be designed very differently. But if young 
and old demand from the same suppliers, then changes in the coverage of 
the under-sixty-five  population could affect the price and access to care of 
the elderly. What is more, the redistributive effects of changes in insur- 
ance may be quite different in the market than within the confines of the 
microexperiment. At the very least, the proper application of the Health 
Insurance Study results to policy decisions necessitates the use of  other 
nonexperimental data. 
4.3  Possible Macroexperimental Remedies 
I now set forth the background of  an illustrative macroexperiment. 
4.3.1  The Stanford Heart Disease 
Prevention Program (SHDPP) 
From 1972 to 1975, the Stanford Heart Disease Prevention Program 
(Farquhar 1978; Farquhar et al. 1977; Meyer et al. 1980;  Stern et al. 1976) 
conducted a field experiment in three California communities, each with 
a population of approximately 15,000. The objective of this pathbreaking 
study was to develop methods for modifying CHD risk that would be 
generally applicable to other community settings. Previous research had 
suggested that mass media campaigns directed at large populations could 
effectively transmit information, alter some attitudes, and produce small 
shifts in behavior such as influencing consumer product choice. But the 
effect of the media on more complex behavior was poorly characterized. 
The planners of SHDPP therefore attempted a factorial experiment in 
which the combined effect of mass media and individualized intervention 
was assessed. From pre-experimentally surveyed populations in all three 
towns, they drew a subsample of  men and women, aged thirty-five to 
fifty-nine, at high risk for CHD on the basis of  cigarette smoking, blood 
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Calif.),  an extensive media  campaign was conducted. In Watsonville 
only, two-thirds  of  the high-risk  subjects were randomly  assigned  to 
individualized  intervention,  while  the remaining  third  served  as the 
media-only control. In the third town (Tracy, Calif.), no intervention was 
performed. Most of  the reported results of  this experiment have been 
derived from annual follow-up surveys of the original pre-experimental 
samples and the high-risk subsamples in the three towns. 
Since the trial was to be coordinated from a single research center, 
intervention was restricted only to two towns. Although the assignment 
to individualized intervention in Watsonville was performed randomly, 
the allocation of  media-based treatments was nonrandom. Although the 
three towns  were  geographically isolated,  the overlapping  television 
signals  of  Watsonville  and  Gilroy  dictated  that these  two  towns  be 
assigned to media intervention. 
4.3.2  Longitudinal versus Cross-Sectional Sampling 
The planners  of  the  SHDPP  experiment  relied  upon  longitudinal 
observations  from a  cohort  of  pre-experimentally  screened subjects. 
Changes in CHD mortality statistics in each community over four years 
would have been too small to distinguish a treatment effect. Accordingly, 
a longitudinal sample may have appeared most appropriate to ascertain 
changes over time in behavior and knowledge of  risk factors. Because 
media  intervention was  not  randomly  assigned, it  may  have seemed 
logical to use serial observations on many variables to bolster the claim 
that  an observed  effect was causal. But reliance  on  a cohort of  pre- 
experimentally screened subjects leaves the experimental results wide 
open to many of the criticisms of microexperimentation, including selec- 
tion artifacts, attrition biases, and Hawthorne effects. 
Of  the entire pre-experimental sample of  2,151 subjects in the three 
towns, only  1,204 actually completed all three follow-up surveys. The 
great fraction of those who failed to complete the study actively refused 
to participate or later dropped out (Stern et al. 1976, table 1;  Maccoby et 
al. 1977, table 1). Among the 381 high-risk.subjects who completed the 
baseline survey and who had not moved or died, 75 had dropped out after 
two years (Maccoby et al. 1977, table 2). By three years, the attrition 
rates among eligible high-risk subjects varied from 22 to 33 percent of 
eligible subjects across towns (Meyer et al. 1980, table 2). The average 
dietary cholesterol and saturated-fat intake, smoking prevalence  and 
intensity, and systolic and diastolic blood pressures generally showed 
improvements over time in both experimental and control groups (Meyer 
et al. 1980, table 4). After three years, the only striking finding was that 
the subjects given both media exposure and individualized instruction 
had quit smoking at a higher rate than the other groups. Relative weight 
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in cholesterol were only suggestive. In view of  these results, it is not 
unreasonable to suspect that the ultimate participants in SHDPP were 
highly motivated, that subject attrition was biased, favoring a positive 
treatment effect, and that many subjects were aware of the presence of an 
experiment. 
These difficulties, however, should not be inherent to macroexperi- 
ments. Since the treatments are applied at the market or community 
level, there is no compelling reason why the responses in each unit should 
be obtained from a cohort. Sufficiently  large, independent cross-sectional 
samples could be used to assess end points within each macro-unit. Since 
all of  the residents in a community are subject to the same treatment, it 
matters  little  if  different  residents  are  sampled  pre-  and  postex- 
perimentally.  Even in  the case of  certain morbid events of  CHD, re- 
peated cross-sectional samples of health-care providers could serve as a 
reasonable substitute for longitudinal samples. To be sure, these proce- 
dures sacrifice precision. But they avoid the biases engendered by sub- 
jects’ decisions to participate and remain in  a cohort, as well as their 
awareness of  participation in an experiment.3 
It is arguable that this trade-off between bias and precision does not 
differ from that encountered in microexperimentation.  Thus, the ex- 
perimenter who  does not  screen on risk  factors or other  dependent 
variables sacrifices statistical power. Overcoming this loss of  precision 
requires more subjects, which in turn increases the cost of  the experi- 
ment. However, the cost of increasing the size of repeated cross-sectional 
surveys within communities may be far less than the cost of  including 
additional  subjects  in  a  longitudinal  microexperiment,  with  all  its 
follow-up interviews, diaries, and logs. 
The advantage of  repeated cross-sectional samples in macroexperi- 
ments is that individual subjects are less likely to be aware of  the experi- 
ment. In fact it may be possible to perform blinded experiments, or at 
least blinded  control^.^ Even if  some subjects became aware of  experi- 
mentation, their incentives to avoid or anticipate the treatment may be 
weaker than in a microexperiment, where subjects can make decisions to 
participate separately from other economic choices. Thus, in a macroex- 
periment, an individual will have less incentive to leave a community 
merely to avoid certain media messages. So long as a different cross 
section is sampled on each round, refusals to respond  are much less 
severe a problem. Of course, it is possible for an entire community to be 
aware of the presence of the experiment. But it is hardly clear that this is 
so undesirable. If  the institution of  an experimental policy causes antic- 
3. In the Stanford Five-City Project, the Pawtucket Heart Health Program, and the 
Minnesota Heart Health Program, a mixture of cohort and cross-sectional sampling is being 
used. 
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ipatory  emigration, or compensatory changes in  local laws, or mass 
protests, that would appear to be a result worth knowing. 
Repeated cross-sectional sampling in macroexperiments may further 
avoid ethical problems  inherent  in  individual randomization.  This is 
because the controls in a macroexperiment are “faceless,” and the lives at 
stake are not specifically identified. To be sure, any subject found during 
sampling to be at high risk must still be informed of  his condition and 
referred appropriately. However, so long as the experimenter samples 
from independent cross sections, and so long as the samples are not large 
in comparison to the population of  the community, these ethical obliga- 
tions should not materially affect the results. It is arguable that imposing 
involuntary participation on the citizens of a community is itself unethical 
(Hulley and Fortmann 1980), but I do not see this objection as insur- 
mountable. 
4.3.3  Costs of  Macroexperimentation 
Macroexperiments may incur lower costs of  instrumentation, but the 
more difficult question is the costs of treatment. In a microexperiment, 
only those individuals who are recruited and sampled undergo treatment. 
In a macroexperiment, everyone in a community receives the treatment, 
even if  his experimental response is not measured. 
Certain types of macroexperiments, such as those involving price sub- 
sidies in large communities, are undoubtedly very expensive. But in many 
instances macroexperimental intervention may exhibit significant econo- 
mies of scale. This applies especially to the use of mass media in SHDPP 
and related experiments, where the marginal cost of  exposing an addi- 
tional person to a health message is near zero. 
4.3.4  Relevance of  Macroexperimentation 
Despite its problems of  instrumentation, the SHDPP media experi- 
ment had one salient advantage over clinical trials such as MRFIT. The 
experimental treatment-that  is, the use of mass media to transmit health 
information, to alter preferences, and possibly to change behavior- 
corresponded to a genuine policy option. The microexperiment may have 
revealed little about the social and behavioral mechanisms underlying the 
response to media intervention (Leventhal et al. 1980), but the elucida- 
tion of mechanisms should not be the objective of  macroexperimenta- 
tion. The main idea is to observe the effect of a contemplated policy in an 
experimental setting that closely approximates the environment in which 
the policy is to be applied. 
The logical response,  of  course, is to ask whether the “black box” 
results of a macroexperiment  are really relevant to the policy under 
consideration. Even if  SHDPP and its progeny experiments should dem- 
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rates, how do we know that media intervention will succeed in other 
communities? To this and related questions I now turn. 
4.4  More Problems with Macroexperiments 
4.4.1  The Confounding of  Treatment Effects 
and Site Effects 
My  most  serious concern about the Stanford three-city trial is  the 
experimenters’ assessment of the number of independent observations in 
their sample. In the early scientific reports on this study, the authors 
assumed that the number of independent observations equalled the total 
number of  sampled subjects in the three communities. This assumption 
would be valid if  applied only to the Watsonville microexperiment in 
which subjects were individually randomized. But for the mass media 
macroexperiments, there were really only three independent observa- 
tions. 
Confusion over the number of  degrees of  freedom in macroexperi- 
ments has been widespread.  In fact, the issue appears to have been 
resolved, broached all over again, and then settled several times in the 
literature. Yet biostatisticians continue to propose formulas for appropri- 
ate sample size in community trials as if  the individual were the unit of 
randomization (Gillum, Williams, and Sondik 1980). 
The confusion derives in part from the view that outcome measure- 
ment in community-prevention trials is merely a form of cluster sampling 
(Cornfield 1978; Gillum, Williams, and Sondik 1980). If  the  experi- 
menter wishes to estimate, say, CHD death rates, then sampling by 
community, rather than by  individuals, will  increase the variance of 
estimated population rates. The increase in variance would be inversely 
related to the degree of homogeneity of  death rates within communities 
and directly related to the extent of heterogeneity between communities. 
Hence, if  the experimenter could select relatively homogeneous in- 
tervention sites, the loss of  efficiency would appear to be minimal. But 
this view ignores the fact that an experiment has been conducted and 
must be interpreted. The real issue is that in the interpretation of  the 
results, the “site effects” are confounded with the “treatment effects.” 
Consider the following example. Suppose that community A is chosen 
for a media campaign and community B is selected as control. Suppose 
further that we could randomly allocate N subjects each to live in these 
two  towns.  Each  subject,  it  is  assumed,  belongs to a homogeneous 
population with respect to pre-experimental risk of  CHD. How should 
we interpret the results of  the media campaign? If  we believed that the 
two  communities  were  merely  artificial  vessels  for  separating  ex- 
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was no intercorrelation of  subject responses, then we have 2N observa- 
tions on the two treatments. But if  the billboard density in a community 
affects the frequency of messages, or the ideology of  the local television 
station owner affects the prominence of health-related commercials, or if 
the configuration of  voluntary agencies affects opinion leadership, or if 
social networks permit greater diffusion of  information, or if  subjects’ 
responses depend on their conformity with others, or if subjects’ changes 
in dietary habits depend on food prices in a community, then we  no 
longer have 2N independent observations. Even if  we could randomly 
assign subjects to communities A and  B, the results could be  quite 
different if town B were instead chosen for intervention and town A were 
instead chosen for the control. Moreover, it would not help to assess the 
pre-experimental variance of death rates between and within communi- 
ties. By construction, these variances would all be zero. The issue is not 
pre-experimental  death rates, but the responses of  death rates to the 
intervention. 
To be sure, site effects are common in  microexperiments, such as 
MRFIT, where the size of  the experiment dictates the deployment of 
multiple clinical centers. But the situation in microexperiments is con- 
siderably different because randomization of subjects takes place within 
each site. Hence, site effects can be distinguished from treatment effects, 
and site-treatment interactions can be tested. 
The literature on clinical trials is replete with tests of  site effects and 
site-treatment  interactions  (e.g. , hospital  effects  in  the  National 
Halothane Study, clinical-center effects in  the University Group Di- 
abetes  Program  trial  of  insulin  or  oral  hypoglycemic agents  versus 
placebo). Hopefully, in the analysis of the final results of  MRFIT, treat- 
ment successes at particular clinical centers will receive scrutiny. But in 
pure macroexperiments,  there is no crossover of  treatments within a 
community. The site effects are fully nested within the treatments. Sam- 
pling more subjects at each site will diminish the variance of the estimated 
death rate within each site, but it will not affect the precision of  these 
site-treatment interactions. In fact, if  we have only two treatments and 
two sites, there are no degrees of freedom to disentangle these treatment- 
site interactions. Only more sites will solve this difficulty. 
4.4.2  External Validity 
When  the experimenter tests for site-treatment interactions, he is 
asking whether any specific characteristic of  a market or community 
could be  uniquely responsible for, say, an observed  effect of  media 
campaigns. If  he samples enough communities, he can distinguish be- 
tween a general media effect, applicable to all sites, and media effects 
that are merely idiosyncratic for certain communities. But then how does 
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sample of  these idiosyncracies? What  would be the effect of  media 
intervention in communities where a single, large employer also started 
his own employee health program, or where a national manufacturer test 
marketed a new, low-cholesterol product? If  relatively small towns were 
selected, as in SHDPP, what would the results tell us about the effects of 
intervention in large cities? Would they be relevant to macroexperiments 
on work groups or domiciliary institutions (Rose et al. 1980; Sherwin 
1978; WHO European Collaborative Group 1974)? 
So  long as the site-treatment interactions  are regarded  as random 
effects, the experimenter is obligated to choose judiciously experimental 
sites that are representative of the environment in which the policy is to 
be instituted. I recognize that even in macroexperiments, one ought to 
select sites that are not wholly unrepresentative. It is thus worth inquiring 
whether the communities selected for HIS possess doctors, hospitals, 
medical standards, and institutions that are typical of  the United States. 
And I have already inquired whether the clinical centers in MRFIT are 
representative of programs of individualized intervention throughout the 
country. But it seems to me that the burden on macroexperiments is 
much greater. 
4.4.3  Randomization of  Macrounits 
Many of the proponents of community-based intervention trials regard 
randomization as an impractical ideal. There are just too many adminis- 
trative political obstacles. Unfortunately, I see virtually no way out of the 
requirement that experimental sites, once selected, must be allocated 
randomly to treatments. I acknowledge numerous instances where evi- 
dence from nonrandomized studies has proved convincing. But in those 
cases, the analysis has hinged on a paucity of plausible rival explanations 
for  the  observed  difference  between  treatment  and  control  groups 
(Campbell and Stanley 1966). But in  macroexperimentation,  there is 
likely to be an abundance of  rival explanations. It is not hard to imagine 
that a town with its own television station or health-conscious opinion 
leaders will  be more willing  to  undergo  a media  campaign.  Such a 
community may be more susceptible to the effects of  such an interven- 
tion. 
4.5  Toward a Science of Macroexperimentation 
Despite substantial advances in design, execution, and interpretation, 
microexperiments still have serious and possibly inherent difficulties. 
Individuals make nonrandom decisions to participate or drop out of the 
experiment. They may be influenced by  the instrumentation process. 
Even in the absence of these difficulties,  microexperiments do not neces- 
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may avoid some of these problems. But convincing macroexperiments 
require many observations at the community or market level. Moreover, 
political and administrative factors may dictate nonrandom selection of 
communities, with its attendant difficulties. And there is always uncer- 
tainty whether the observed effect of  treatment in a sample of communi- 
ties was not due to idiosyncratic, unrepresentative characteristics of the 
experimental sites. 
We  are thus faced with  a  serious dilemma.  Should we  perform  a 
microexperiment, optimistic that instrumentation artifacts will not arise, 
and thankful to learn something about one aspect of a complicated policy 
problem? Or  should we plunge ahead with a “sloppy” macroexperiment, 
with all of  its difficulties of  interpretation and generalization? 
4.5.1  Decentralized Macroexperiments 
Because SHDPP  was to be coordinated by a single research center, the 
experiment was restricted to only three towns. Once these three were 
selected, random assignment to media exposure was made impossible by 
overlapping  television  signals.  But  it  is  worth  speculating what  ex- 
perimental design might have arisen from a multi-center trial. If the 
Stanford group had been one of  many research centers, couldn’t they 
have selected a pair of towns, both of which had nonoverlapping televi- 
sion signals? Why couldn’t treatment be randomly assigned between the 
two towns? Why couldn’t the Stanford city-pair be one block in a larger 
matched-pair experiment? 
My point here is that many of the most serious difficulties of  macroex- 
periments may result from overcentralization. So long as we could allo- 
cate pairs of  comparable sites (or perhaps larger subsets) to individual 
experimental blocks, the execution of each block could be the responsi- 
bility of  a separate research center. Within each block, randomization 
may be more feasible. Increasing the statistical power of the experiment, 
and perhaps its external validity, means increasing the number of blocks. 
Such a design is not entirely speculative. In fact, the WHO European 
Collaborative Group (1974; Rose et al. 1980) has been conducting a 
macroexperiment  in  CHD prevention  in  twelve pairs  of  factories in 
various cities. These factories (or in some cases occupational units within 
factories) were  recruited  into the trial  before  random  assignment to 
treatment or control. The factory pairs were matched as far as possible by 
age, geographical area, and the nature of  the industry. The subjects 
include all male employees aged forty to fifty-nine years, not merely 
those  at  high  risk.  This  design  unfortunately  involves longitudinal 
follow-up of cohorts. Hence, it may be susceptible to participation biases, 
selective employee turnover, and Hawthorne effects. But it illustrates the 
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One might object that only small units, such as factories and domicili- 
ary institutions, are susceptible to randomization (Sherwin 1978). Larger 
political entities will merely balk at the uncertain prospect of  receiving 
the less desirable assignment. But it is hardly clear to me that this state of 
affairs is inevitable.  For  one thing,  the  possibility of  randomization 
among matched pairs may be more palatable politically than random 
drawings from a larger population  of  sites. In some cases where the 
eligible sites are political subdivisions under the governance of  a higher 
authority, the possibility of  site self-selection may not be so serious. In 
fact, several macroexperiments in  cancer screening, in which  census 
tracts, townships, or counties are the relevant sites, have already been 
proposed (Apostolides and Henderson 1977). Moreover, in cases where 
communities or  organizations have already received some type of govern- 
ment grant or benefit, the continued receipt of that benefit could be made 
the incentive for participation in the experiment. In cases where various 
communities apply for grants to become demonstration sites for a par- 
ticular innovation, the awards process could be broken down into two 
stages. A subset of deserving, eligible sites would first be chosen. Among 
eligible sites, treatment and control assignments could then be made. It is 
remarkable to  me how often government agencies  and other grantors first 
make the awards to the most deserving sites and then ponder how a 
comparable set of  control sites is to be chosen from the losers for the 
purpose of  project evaluation. 
When  intervention at a  large number  of  sites is  managed  by  one 
research or administrative group, the inevitable consequence is a ration- 
ing of limited intervention effort to a few sites. In extreme cases, many of 
the so-called intervention sites do not receive any intervention because 
the research team has merely lost control of  the project. Administrative 
decentralization of  macroexperiments could allay some of  these prob- 
lems. Moreover, some degree of blinding may be possible. At the least, a 
research team responsible for intervention in one block of sites need not 
know the progress of  the experiment in other blocks. 
4.5.2  Time-Series Experiments and Crossover Designs 
The possibility that communities or other macro-units could serve as 
their own controls has not been adequately explored. Admittedly, any 
comparison over time is susceptible to confounding interpretations. Ex- 
perimental responses take some time to be completed. What appears to 
be the effect of  a cross-over may actually be a transient from earlier 
intervention (Morris, Newhouse, and Archibald 1980). If  the macroex- 
periment is not blinded, then the effects of crossover could be confused 
with anticipatory responses or other Hawthorne effects. Nevertheless, 
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Although these devices have been derived from microexperiments, they 
could at least be tried in the macrosetting. 
For example, in the case of  a matched-pair design, the treatment and 
control communities could reverse their assignments later in the experi- 
ment. The timing of this reversal need not be scheduled in advance, or at 
least known to the experimental units. Stopping short of complete cross- 
over, I could also envisage folding-back designs. We could begin by  a 
series of  observations on communities in which no intervention is insti- 
tuted. Thereafter, one or more of  the communities becomes a treatment 
site. In sequence, the remaining communities receive the intervention. 
Again, the sequence and schedule of  assignment could be random and 
unknown  to the  experimental  units.  If  all  of  the units  are destined 
ultimately to receive the intervention, randomization with respect to the 
sequence and timing of the intervention may not present so many politi- 
cal or administrative obstacles. Such folding back designs may be partic- 
ularly useful when the endpoints are subject to habit formation and thus 
difficult to change in short intervention intervals. 
4.5.3  Mixed Macro and Micro Designs 
In some cases, a mixture of micro and macro designs might enhance the 
power of the experiment. Such cases arise when the interventions at the 
individual and site levels are qualitatively similar. 
In the SHDPP trial, a subexperiment of  individual intervention was 
performed within Watsonville, a town receiving media intervention. This 
subexperiment was designed to test the interaction between the two types 
of  experimental treatments. Unfortunately, the investigators were un- 
able to conduct an identical subexperiment in Tracy, the town receiving 
no media  intervention. But  even if  a full factorial design had  been 
undertaken, the two types of  treatment were qualitatively different, so 
that only their crude interaction could be profitably investigated. 
In other cases, however, both interventions could be close enough to 
conform to a simple response model. Suppose, for example, that the 
experimenter wishes to investigate the effects of varying employer con- 
tributions to employee health-insurance  premiums.  Since changes in 
employee benefits are typically performed  at the level of  the firm, a 
macroexperiment would be appropriate, with various firms correspond- 
ing to different  macro sites. But within each firm, employer contributions 
could be further varied among employees. Such an experiment could 
offer considerable insight into firm-specific and employee-specific re- 
sponses to changes in employee premium subsidies. 
4.5.4  Combining Macroexperiments 
A potential significant  advantage of  macroexperimental blocking is its 
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block, experimental sites might possess similar characteristics, but be- 
tween blocks the site characteristics could vary considerably. In commu- 
nity-based life-style intervention, it would be especially informative for 
blocks to vary with respect to the size, climate, age structure, sex, racial, 
and ethnic composition of  their member communities. 
A  number  of  independent  community-based life-style-intervention 
trials are already in progress in this country. Taken together, these trials 
might be considered a single macroexperiment with multiple blocks. The 
difficulty with this interpretation,  however, is that the method of  in- 
tervention may vary considerably from one block to the next. We thus 
cannot easily distinguish between a block effect and a block-treatment 
interaction. If  some community trials show significant effects of life-style 
intervention and others do not, it will be unclear whether the discrepan- 
cies resulted from differences in the type of  media intervention across 
trials, or differences in the susceptibility of  communities to media mes- 
sages. The results of  different trials could be combined only if  we had 
some prior  information  on the relationship  between types of  media 
intervention employed. 
Some recent theoretical work on combining diverse experiments might 
be usefully applied to this problem (DuMouchel and Harris 1983). A 
complete exposition is necessarily beyond the scope of the present paper. 
But the main idea is to specify formally a structural relationship between 
the treatment effects in each community trial. For example, the magni- 
tude of the effect on CHD  rates might depend on the extent of electronic- 
media intervention, the duration of  intervention, or the recruitment of 
voluntary agencies. A model of  the treatment effect that relates these 
characteristics is then superimposed upon the results of  each trial. The 
main issue in the application of  such a technique is the degree to which 
life-style intervention in each trial was independent of the characteristics 
of the communities under observation. For example, if the experimenters 
in a particular  trial resorted to scientifically oriented media messages 
because the target communities were highly educated, it may be impossi- 
ble to distinguish between the treatment effect of media content and the 
role of  educational background in a community’s response. 
4.5.5  Competition Experiments, Regulation Experiments, 
and Deregulation Experiments 
Reduction of  the tax subsidy on health-insurance coverage, elimina- 
tion of  barriers to entry for prepaid health-care providers, and enhance- 
ment of consumer choice of  health-insurance plans have been proposed 
to control rising health-care expenditures. Virtually all of  the evidence 
supporting the efficacy of  these interventions is nonexperimental.  Our 
policy makers could, of course, take the available data as sufficient cause 
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to  me, is to assess some of these innovations experimentally before taking 
such a precipitous step. I have already hinted how  several large em- 
ployers  in  a  number  of  different  cities might  serve as sites for  ex- 
perimental  changes  in  employee  health-insurance  benefits.  Perhaps 
several distinct divisions of  the same large corporation could form an 
experimental block. Community-based experiments, in which the effects 
on market competition are observed, are also conceivable. 
Regulatory controls on health-care expenditures have also been sug- 
gested. Although various innovative forms of  hospital reimbursement 
have been tried, most of the so-called reimbursement experiments have 
really been uncontrolled demonstration projects. In view of the substan- 
tial likelihood that hospitals subject to those novel controls have been 
selected in a biased manner, it is hard to know exactly what significance 
these projects should have for future policy decisions. It is difficult for me 
to see why the experimenters have not blocked participating hospitals 
according to, say, size, teaching status, or range of  facilities, and then 
randomly assigned the novel form of reimbursement within each block. 
One variant of the fold-back design discussed above is the deregulation 
experiment. In this case, the experimental treatment is the removal of an 
intervention already in place. The sequence and timing of deregulation at 
various sites is the critical control variable. This type of  design may be 
particularly useful when the value of a regulatory program is in question. 
Even if our policy makers deem that physician-peer review schemes or 
health-planning agencies are to be discontinued, it would be valuable to 
learn something about the effects of  these policies during their demise. 
4.6  Conclusions 
This paper can be easily criticized for its lack of  balance. I have sought 
out the most subtle crack in microexperiments, yet I am willing to cover 
large faults in macroexperiments with hopeful speculation. 
The plain truth is that macroexperiments in public policy-or at least 
corrupted versions of  macroexperiments-are  far more prevalent than 
the microexperiments to which social scientists have devoted so much 
attention. It is not too soon to develop some meaningful strategies for 
effective macroexperimentation. 
4.7  Epilogue, 1981-84 
After this paper was written  (spring 1981), the main results of  the 
Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial were published (MRFIT Group 
1982). Although CHD deaths in the special-intervention group were 7 
percent less than in the usual-care group, the difference was not statisti- 
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low death rate of the usual-care group-40  percent lower than expected. 
The usual-care  subjects apparently  benefitted  from  the  information 
about their high CHD  risk and the provision to their physicians of original 
and follow-up medical data. 
Although both the experimental and control groups showed declines in 
blood pressure, cholesterol and cigarette use, nevertheless the experi- 
ment was singularly successful in achieving much greater smoking cessa- 
tion in the SI group than in the UC group (figure 1  and table 2 in MRFIT 
Group 1982; also, Ockene et al. 1982). Among men who were smokers at 
initial screening, however, mortality differences between the SI and UC 
groups were modest (table 5 in MRFIT Group 1982). Yet among all 
subjects (both SI and UC) who smoked at the time of entry, those persons 
known to have quit smoking in the first study year had considerably lower 
subsequent death rates than those known to have continued smoking 
(table 9 in MRFIT Group 1982). A plausible interpretation is that smok- 
ers who missed their first year follow-up  visit had much higher subsequent 
death rates than those smokers who reported their status. Moreover, the 
mortality  differential between  those who missed follow-up visits and 
those who returned was more marked for the SI subjects. Thus, special 
intervention was apparently more effective than usual care in producing 
attrition among the really sick people. Those SI subjects  who remained in 
the intervention program had lower CHD mortality, but not much lower 
than those nonattriters in the UC group. 
After the current paper was written, the Stanford Heart Disease Pre- 
vention Project published a reanalysis of the three-city data (Williams et 
al. 1981). The new analysis acknowledged that the communities, and not 
the individual subjects, could be the experimental units. For such end- 
points as cholesterol and blood pressure, the authors computed mean 
values for each of  the three towns and for each of  the four years of  the 
study. The slopes derived from linear trend regressions on each town 
were then compared. By stacking together the slope estimations in a 
single regression, the authors were able to make a few statistically signifi- 
cant inferences, but the results still had far less precision than those 
previously reported. 
After this paper was written, the Rand group published a number of 
“interim results” of its Health Insurance Study. Such results were based 
on about 40 percent of the total person years that are ultimately available 
for analysis (Keeler et al. 1982; Newhouse et al. 1982; Duan et al. 1983). 
In comparison to free care, copayment for medical services was found to 
reduce the number of  ambulatory visits and the number of  hospitaliza- 
tions among adults, but not the cost per hospital stay. When health-care 
use was aggregated into episodes of  illness, copayment was found to 
reduce the number of  episodes but not the cost per episode. 
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two-thirds of  hospitalized subjects incurred expenses that exceeded the 
maximum expenditure for even the highest copayment plans. Hence, 
most hospitalized patients faced marginal coinsurance rates that were 
effectively zero.  An  alternative explanation is that patients with  full 
coverage were hospitalized with less serious and thus less costly illnesses. 
Or perhaps patients have little or no influence on the disposition of  care 
once they have sought treatment. In any case, these findings highlight the 
study’s limited focus on the demand side of  the medical-cost problem. 
The continuing rise in medical expenditures reflects increases in the costs 
per hospital stay and no doubt the costs per episode of  illness. On the 
demand side, these critical variables may to be unaffected by  realistic 
changes in coverage. But what about the supply side? 
Statistical analysis of  the HIS results has not  been so simple. The 
pattern of health-care expenses for each of the plans included a substan- 
tial fraction with zero claims. The distribution of  positive expenditures 
showed a long right-hand tail caused by  rare, very large claims. Thus, 
confidence intervals derived from the conventional normality assumption 
were quite large. To improve precision, the Rand investigators devised a 
four-equation regression model to assess the effects of the experimental 
plans. In the first probit equation, the probability of  medical use de- 
pended on plan dummy variables and various covariates (for example, 
physician visits predicted from 1971 national data based on the age and 
sex of  each subject). In  a second probit equation, the probability of 
hospital expenditures conditional on use of care depended on additional 
interaction effects between age and plan that the Rand authors discov- 
ered to be important. In a third regression equation, the logarithm of 
expenditures among those with only outpatient use had a variance com- 
ponent for intrafamily effects. In the fourth regression equation, the 
logarithm of  expenditures among those with inpatient care did not de- 
pend on dummy variables for individual plans. Because of large outliers, 
the  latter  equation  was  estimated  by  a  robust  weighted  regression 
method.  To correct for the bias in  transforming the predicted  mean 
expenditures from the log scale back  to the arithmetic scale, a new 
nonparametric estimate was developed. The  standard errors for  the 
transformed means were then estimated from first-order approximations 
(Duan et al. 1983). The authors have acknowledged that predicted ex- 
penditures by  plan  (and their confidence intervals) are highly model- 
dependent and that there is the danger of  overfitting the data. Much to 
their credit, they have performed some interesting tests for such over- 
fitting on a subsample of  the interim data. But they do concede with 
appropriate caution that later analysis of the full experiment may lead to 
further modeling changes as more data are accumulated at the far right 
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In retrospect, my paper glossed over certain problems of macroexperi- 
mentation that deserved more careful scrunity. 
First, I did not address what types of policy interventions are accessible 
to macroexperimental analysis. The media campaigns of  SHDPP were 
obviously suited to community-wide study. But many policy interven- 
tions are aimed at small, diffusely scattered populations of  eligible per- 
sons. How, for example, might we assess a proposed plan for insurance 
coverage of  a particular medical intervention such as organ transplanta- 
tion or hospice care for terminal illness? Here, we  need to be more 
creative in defining appropriate macroexperimental units, such as trans- 
plantation centers or individual hospices. 
Second, I merely suggested without strong supporting evidence that 
macroexperimentation might be more immune to the Hawthorne effects, 
selection and attrition biases, and other artifacts that have plagued micro- 
studies.  Certainly, if  we  sampled towns with pre-experimentally high 
childhood leukemia rates and then in half of them compelled residents to 
drink only bottled water, we might very well see leukemia rates fall (by 
regression to the mean) or maybe a large confounding population ex- 
odus. But for more realistic cases, it is a serious empirical question 
whether such artifacts will be significant. In MRFIT, to be sure, we might 
know  enough  about intertemporal variation in  an individual’s serum 
cholesterol levels to correct for potential regression to the mean and 
pre-experimental selection bias. But it is not obvious that comparable 
data on intertemporal variation in site characteristics would be so scarce. 
Third, I acknowledge that repeated, independent cross sections would 
result in much less precise intrasite estimates than might be afforded by 
cohort sampling. But I avoided asking exactly how much precision might 
be lost by the use of such cross sections. Certainly, if  the endpoint under 
consideration  displayed  extremely  high  intertemporal  correlations 
among individuals, the required sample sizes might be an order of magni- 
tude larger. But it is not obvious that the cost of  such cross-sectional 
sampling will be so much larger. 
Fourth, I was too cavalier about the generalizability of  macroexper- 
imentai results. The success of  a macroexperimental study of  the use of 
electronic media in health promotion  might depend, say, upon which 
celebrities gave testimonials. The effects of  changes in tax treatment of 
health insurance among various experimental corporate sites might de- 
pend, say, upon the relations between organized labor and top manage- 
ment. The effects of alteration of physician payment for hospital-based 
care might depend, say, upon the facilities available at the site hospitals. 
Such uncertainties are inherent in any form of  public policy evaluation. 
Macroexperimentation, however, may be better equipped to overcome 
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Fifth, I did not meet the challenge of  designing a macroexperiment 
analogous to the HIS. The difficulty I encountered here is that a health- 
insurance macroexperiment would end up asking questions quite differ- 
ent from those asked in the Rand study. Do changes in insurance cover- 
age affect the rate of  introduction of new techniques into a market, or the 
rate of  entry of  hospitals,  prepaid  plans  or other providers?  Would 
expansion of coverage result in various health-care rationing schemes, 
including queues, triage,  or more  regulation?  To be  sure, observed 
changes in entry into experimental communities (from nonexperimental 
areas) might not mimic the responses to a nationally available insurance 
system.  It may  take considerably  longer  for suppliers’ responses  to 
changes in insurance to reach long-run equilibrium. Still, the questions 
are too important to be ignored. 
Finally, wasn’t I just kidding myself about the real costs of  macroex- 
perimentation?  Wouldn’t  large-scale  interventions  entail  enormous 
administrative and treatment expenses? I think not. We are constantly 
instituting new demonstration projects and innovations in the health-care 
arena without careful advanced planning as to the ultimate evaluation of 
such efforts. The genuine costs of macroexperiments lie in the additional 
resources required to look forward as well as back. 
Comment  Paul B. Ginsburg 
Jeffrey Harris’s stimulating paper argues that we have had an imbalance 
between social microexperiments and social macroexperiments. Drawing 
upon the experience of  experimentation in the health area, he shows that 
microexperiments have had serious problems that would be difficult to 
correct, while  the problems with macroexperiments  tend to be more 
amenable to solution through clever experimental design. 
The paper describes clearly the seriousness of some of  the following 
obstacles to the validity of microexperiments: 1)  biases in the selection of 
subjects and attrition, 2) anticipatory responses and Hawthorne effects, 
3) ethical restraints on randomization, and 4)  interdependence among 
individuals. 
It then discusses how macroexperiments can avoid these problems. For 
example, macroexperiments can study market equilibria, thus recording 
the effects of  interdependencies among individuals. By not requiring 
individual volunteers,  selection biases  are eliminated.  The nature of 
intervention in macroexperiments also avoids many ethical constraints, 
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such as the need to inform control-group participants of the presence of 
medical conditions and the value of  conventional treatments. 
Nevertheless, macroexperiments do have some serious disadvantages. 
One is reduced  statistical power. Harris points out that the relevant 
number of observations in a macroexperiment is the number of sites, not 
the size of  the affected population. Given the inability to control other 
determinants of the outcome in question, inferences from a handful of 
sites have limited statistical power. Another problem is the administra- 
tive and political obstacles to randomization. 
Harris’s paper is a valuable one. His critiques of microexperiments are 
clearly presented and convincing. Rather than simply listing theoretical 
problems, he makes a careful case about their importance for validity. 
His ideas for overcoming some of the problems in macroexperiments are 
good ones that will benefit social experiments. 
While I agree with many of the points that Harris makes, I am some- 
what  uncomfortable  with  his  characterization  of  the  choice  as  one 
between a microexperiment or a macroexperiment. I wonder how fre- 
quently both options are practically available and are the first and second 
choices. A more common choice is between an experiment and collection 
of nonexperimental data. With the Health Insurance Study, for example, 
I would expect those most critical of  the problems encountered by it to 
advocate increased collection of  nonexperimental  data rather than  a 
macroexperiment with national health insurance. The latter would be 
quite expensive, and its limited time period would lead us to question 
whether full-fledged market  effects are being  observed. Indeed, the 
nonexperimental alternative to the Rand Experiment was actually per- 
formed, funded by a different agency in the Department of Health and 
Human Services. The National Medical Care Expenditure Survey, spon- 
sored by  the National  Center for Health Services Research  and the 
National Center for Health Statistics took a substantial step forward from 
previous  health-care  surveys by  employing periodic  interviews  and 
obtaining direct information from insurers, employers, and medical pro- 
viders to supplement that obtained from the respondent. 
Often the choice of micro- versus macroexperiments is dictated by the 
nature of  the proposed intervention. Since SHDPP used mass media as 
the intervention, no choice between a micro- or macroexperiment ex- 
isted. When an intervention specific to individuals is the object of study, 
there is a theoretical choice, but expense often renders the macro version 
unrealistic. 
I am in agreement with Harris that creativity on the part of researchers 
can yield a great deal of  macroexperimental analysis. Government is 
frequently initiating (and more currently terminating) programs. Budget- 
ary, administrative, and political constraints often require that programs 
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researchers could tremendously increase its potential generation of eval- 
uative information. 
One program of  this sort that I am familiar with is the Professional 
Standards Review Organization  (PSRO) program, which reviews the 
appropriateness of medical services delivered to Medicare and Medicaid 
patients. The program was phased in by funding as many local volunteer 
organizations as the federal budget would permit. While the willingness 
of  a local physicians’ group to participate was important to the workings 
of  the program, randomization among the volunteers could have been 
performed, even if  it resulted in some delay in implementation. 
Now the program is being phased out. The Department of Health and 
Human Services is selecting for defunding those agencies it feels are least 
effective. Since ability to distinguish between those more effective than 
others is limited, a larger list of the least effective organizations could be 
developed and randomization performed on this list to choose which ones 
to defund. 
Harris’s idea for getting information from demonstrations is a good 
one. He is correct that the manner in which organizations are chosen for 
demonstrations  prevents  useful  inferences,  but  that  randomization 
among the volunteers could provide meaningful information. 
The suggestions concerning social experiments for competition in the 
financing and delivery of health care are interesting. A true macroexperi- 
ment, involving selecting certain markets for changes in tax policies and 
changes in Medicare reimbursement, is probably not feasible. But an 
experiment would be feasible and useful to test employees’  responses to a 
choice of  insurance plans, which is perhaps the link in the competition 
model that the least is known about. The experimenter could probably 
even simulate tax-free rebates without changing the tax law by  making 
payments to offset taxes due. I do not know whether such an experiment 
would be characterized as micro or macro. Clearly it has elements of 
both. Its results would be far more useful than those reported by  em- 
ployers initiating such programs on their own. 
Comment  Lawrence L. Orr 
Choosing between Macroexperiments 
and Microexperiments 
Jeffrey Harris argues that “economists and other social scientists. . .  have 
spent disproportionately too much effort on the design and interpretation 
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of microexperiments” and suggests that greater attention should be given 
to the potential use of macroexperiments. He defines microexperiments 
as those in which “the experimenter assigns treatments and gauges re- 
sponses at the level of  the individual,” whereas “in social macroexperi- 
ments, treatments  are assigned at the group, community, or market 
level.” While Harris is careful to assure us that “this paper is not a broad 
endorsement of  macroexperiments” and “does not advocate the aban- 
donment of microexperiments,” the theme of the paper is that microex- 
periments are subject to a long list of  inherent defects that, one gathers, 
render confident interpretation of the results almost impossible, whereas 
the (much shorter list of) shortcomings of macroexperiments are remedi- 
able through clever design. 
On the basis of  my own experience with both types of  experimental 
research,’ I find both Harris’s indictment of  microexperiments and his 
enthusiasm for macroexperiments seriously overdrawn. Perhaps more 
fundamentally, I think that he has not posed the central question in the 
most useful way: The real question is not which type of  experiment is 
“better” in some absolute sense, but which is more appropriate to the 
problem at hand. 
Harris and I appear to have fundamentally different views of the role of 
experiments in the policy process. Harris appears to take as his starting 
point a single well-defined program  (or, at most, a few) of  unknown 
efficacy; the  role  of  the experiment  is  to provide  a comprehensive, 
holistic evaluation of  this program or programs, so that the policy maker 
can make a simple goho go, adoptkeject decision. 
This approach leads him naturally to what I would term “black box” 
experiments, applied to whole populations with or without experimental 
variations, relatively simple aggregate-outcome measures, and little or 
no analysis of underlying response behavior. In contrast, I tend to assume 
that the policy maker starts with a whole range of program options that 
can be  characterized  by  a finite set of  policy parameters  (tax rates, 
subsidy levels, staffklient ratios, etc.). The function of  the experiment, 
then, is to provide measures of  the response to these policy parameters 
that will enable the policy maker to select that combination, or those 
levels, of  policy instruments that achieve the “best” outcomes, i.e., to 
design the program. This paradigm leads me naturally to experiments 
with many variations and extensive analysis of  micro data in order to 
estimate individual response functions. 
1. In recent years, I have had some  involvement in the design, execution, andor  analysis 
of  the  four income-maintenance  experiments  conducted  by  OEO and HEW, HUD’s 
housing-allowance  experiments,  the  OEOMEW health-insurance  experiment,  HEW’S 
experiments in AFDC administration and disability insurance, and DOL‘s Employment 
Opportunity Pilot Projects and (the stillborn) Positive Adjustment Assistance Demonstra- 
tions. All except the DOL projects were (primarily) microexperiments; the DOL projects 
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This latter view of the role of experiments seems to me in keeping with 
the way  we  treat most other research-we  seldom expect individual 
nonexperimental research projects to render global assessments of major 
policy initiatives-but  I will concede that there is a nontrivial set of policy 
questions for which the black box experiment is appropriate. As I have 
already suggested, the trick is to figure out which policy issues are in that 
set. 
To do that, though, one must have a full appreciation for the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of  the two modes of  experimentation. There- 
fore, in what follows, I will first discuss briefly the methodological issues 
raised in the paper with respect to microexperiments and some of  the 
problems of  doing macroexperiments,  before attempting to lay out a 
general set of  criteria for choosing between the two in  addressing any 
particular policy questions. 
I should note at the outset that much of  my  experience with experi- 
mentation is in nonhealth areas and that therefore many of the examples 
and counterexamples in what follows relate to nonhealth interventions. 
The issues raised by Harris, however, are primarily methodological ones 
that cut across substantive research areas, so the actual subject matter 
under investigation is often of secondary importance to the argument. If 
one is to argue from example-and  it appears that in many cases that is 
the best we  can do at this stage of  development of  the art of  experi- 
mentation-it  seems to me that more examples are preferable to less. 
There is no question that a number of serious methodological problems 
are  encountered in designing and interpreting microexperiments; most of 
them are listed in this paper. But it should be recognized that many of 
these problems are not peculiar to microexperimentation; they apply 
with equal force to many other types of  empirical research, including 
macroexperiments.  Thus, for example, the problems of  misreporting, 
interview refusal, attrition, and Hawthorne effects are really problems of 
longitudinal survey research. Any  researcher  doing nonexperimental 
statistical analysis of the Current Population Survey or the Health Inter- 
view Survey faces these same problems, although it is my  observation 
that  nonexperimental  researchers  are  much  less  likely  than  experi- 
menters to recognize or attempt to deal with them. Moreover, these 
problems will also afflict any macroexperiment that relies on surveys for 
its data base (as Harris himself notes). 
Some of the problems posed by Harris-for  example, the necessity of 
using “detailed-response surface models” for analysis and the constraints 
imposed by  ethical considerations-are  inherent in the problem being 
addressed, not in the experimental methodology. It seems self-evident 
that sorting out the causal relationships among health-insurance cover- 
age, consumption of  medical care, and health status is an exceedingly 
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however the research data is generated. Likewise, if  it is unethical to 
provide  (or withhold)  a particular  treatment  to a randomly selected 
individual in a microexperiment, it is hard for me to conceive that it is 
ethical to do so to a group or entire community in a macroexperiment. 
There are, of  course, limitations that are inherent in  microexperi- 
mentation  itself.  Microexperiments are inevitably of  relatively short 
duration and therefore may not reveal long-run, steady-state responses. 
This characteristic is, of  course, shared by  macroexperiments. If  the 
likelihood of bias in a particular application seems serious, the researcher 
might be well advised to consider some nonexperimental data source, 
such as observations on “natural experiments” or data from ongoing 
programs, instead of--or  in addition to-experimentation.  Likewise, so 
long as participation in microexperiments is voluntary, selection bias is an 
ever-present danger. As I argue below, however, closely analogous prob- 
lems exist in macroexperiments. Selection bias is, of course, endemic in 
nonexperimental data. 
Perhaps the most  fundamental criticism raised by  Harris-and  the 
point on which we disagree most strongly-is  the relevance of  microex- 
periments to policy. In the context of the Multiple Risk Factor Interven- 
tion Trial, he argues that the treatment “does not necessarily correspond 
to a viable policy option.” This is so, he argues, because intervention at 
the individual level is expensive; public policies are more likely to take 
the form of  organizational, educational, or regulatory efforts aimed at 
diffusing information or changing behavior in the community at large. I 
certainly agree that MRFIT will not predict the outcome of  those poli- 
cies. If  the objective was to learn what effect, say, a particular mass media 
educational campaign would have on aggregate rates of  coronary heart 
disease in the community, then by all means that is the policy that should 
have been tested, and it could probably only be tested with a macroex- 
periment. The fact that the researchers did not do so indicates that either 
that was not their objective or that they showed poor judgment in their 
choice of  research strategy; it  does not strike me as an indictment of 
microexperimentation per se, beyond the rather obvious point that no 
single methodology is applicable to all problems. It does seem useful (in 
some cases) to carefully test treatments that represent a stronger in- 
tervention than could be replicated nationally, in order to establish an 
upper bound on the effects that can reasonably be  expected from a 
particular type of policy. I have no way of knowing whether that was part 
of  the motivation for MRFIT. 
Harris levels a similar criticism at the Health Insurance Study. As he 
indicates, that experiment was designed primarily to estimate the effects 
of alternative levels and forms of cost sharing on the demand for medical 
care. Thus, he argues, it excludes a variety of  institutional and supply- 
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national program, and therefore will not be able to  directly predict those 
outcomes. I certainly would not quarrel with that characterization of  the 
experiment, nor would its other designers. But I don’t particularly regard 
that as a serious criticism either of the methodology or of the experiment 
itself. No single project can address all aspects of a complex, multi-billion 
dollar national program, and the Health Insurance Experiment  is no 
exception. It was never intended to directly predict the utilization out- 
comes under any  particular national health-insurance plan. Rather,  it was 
intended to fill a gaping hole in our knowledge about underlying con- 
sumer behavior in the health sector. It was recognized from the beginning 
that demand-side information would have to be combined with whatever 
analyses are possible of institutional and supply-side response to derive 
national estimates of  costs and utilization; but it is equally true that no 
reasonable estimates of  national outcomes can be produced without the 
demand-side information that will be produced by the experiment.  In 
short, this criticism is a perfect illustration of my fundamental disagree- 
ment with Harris over whether experiments should attempt holistic repli- 
cation of complex policies or should simply attempt to generate reliable 
information on one or more-presumably  important-pieces  of  the pol- 
icy design problem. 
Harris’s  discussion  of  macroexperiments  is  much  more  sanguine, 
although he does acknowledge some  of the problems posed by this type of 
experiment. He notes, for example, that since the basic unit of observa- 
tion in a macroexperiment is an entire group or community, the feasible 
sample size (i.e. ,  number of communities) and representativeness may be 
severely limited, and that confounding of  site and treatment effects may 
be a serious problem. It may also be difficult to randomize groups or 
communities to treatment and control status  because of  administrative or 
political considerations. Finally, he concedes that attempts to measure 
outcomes  with longitudinal, individual-level survey data  will be subject to 
many of  the problems encountered in microexperiments and suggests 
that repeated cross-sectional surveys be conducted instead. His discus- 
sion of these issues seriously underestimates their likely severity, how- 
ever, and is overly sanguine about their proposed remedies. It also omits 
some of the more serious difficulties of mounting rigorous macroexperi- 
ments. 
Many of the problems of macroexperiments flow from the sheer size of 
the natural observational units. Where the unit of observation is an entire 
market, for example, these projects can be extremely expensive. The 
original planning budgets for HUD’s housing-allowance supply experi- 
ment (two housing markets) and DOL’s Employment Opportunity Pilot 
Projects (fifteen labor markets) were each on the order of $400 million. 
That  is  considerably  more  than  the  budgets  of  all  the  income- 
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housing-allowance demand  experiment  (all  microexperiments)  com- 
bined. The high cost of “saturating” an entire market leads, of course, to 
severe limits on the number of  observations. It also tends to favor the 
selection of  small markets and, for many purposes, virtually precludes 
selecting cities like New York, Los Angeles, or Chicago, thereby jeopar- 
dizing the representativeness of  the sample. 
The constraints on budget and sample size can be severe even with 
units of  observation much smaller than an entire market. The Labor 
Department recently hired two contractors to prepare alternative designs 
for a set of  demonstrations of  employment and training services for 
workers disemployed in plant closings. One contractor estimated that the 
optimal number  of  plants  required to disentangle plant  effects from 
individual  responses  was  133; the  other  contractor  (using  different 
assumptions) arrived at an optimal sample size of about 1,000  plants. The 
DOL budget for the project was $50 million-about  the cost of a “typi- 
cal” microexperiment. That budget would have supported a sample of at 
most 50 plants, even if the sample were heavily skewed toward atypically 
small plants. 
The sample-size constraint not only affects the statistical precision of 
the results, it also severely restricts the number of treatment options that 
can be tested. In the Employment Opportunity Pilot Projects, for exam- 
ple, an initial list of seven “planned variations” of the basic program was 
ultimately reduced to two, after long and painful deliberation, on the 
grounds that more variations within a fifteen-site project would jeopar- 
dize the chance of  learning anything reliable about either the variations 
or the basic program itself. Even in  the plant-closing demonstrations, 
with a potential sample of as many as fifty plants, both design contractors 
agreed that it  would  be  risky  to try more  than five  or six  different 
treatments unless randomization within plants (i.e., embedding microex- 
periments within the macroexperiment) was allowed. In both of  these 
cases, there were literally dozens or even hundreds of  treatment levels 
and combinations that were of policy interest and very little ability to use 
the treatments actually tested to interpolate or extrapolate to options not 
tested. 
These projects illustrate vividly the problem of black box experiments 
mentioned earlier. In projects like these, where only a small fraction of a 
large number of  potential policy options can be implemented, the ex- 
perimenter is in the almost impossible position of trying to predict which 
policy options will be relevant as much as ten years in the future, when the 
project has been completed and the data analyzed. In the light of  the 
recent dramatic policy shifts at the federal level, this task seems almost 
hopeless.  The Employment  Opportunity Pilot Projects, for example, 
were  focused heavily  on public-service employment when  they were 
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support for public-service employment. By way  of  contrast, the treat- 
ments in the Health Insurance Experiment span the entire range of policy 
options in one important dimension of  health-financing policy. 
Perhaps the most serious problem arising out of the scale of  macroex- 
periments is the difficulty of control and administration. It is not only that 
the number and size of sites required for valid inference presents a serious 
span-of-control problem-although  that is certainly the case. The scale of 
these projects will often require that they be implemented by the regular- 
program bureaucracy. The experimenters’ objectives will conflict in im- 
portant ways with the objectives of regular-program operators, and it will 
be exceedingly difficult to ensure that even those few treatments selected 
for testing are actually implemented as intended. The monitors of DOL’s 
Employment Opportunity Pilot Projects faced a steady stream of resist- 
ance and requests for exceptions to federal guidelines from the CETA 
prime sponsors running the project.  Often program operators simply 
ignored the guidelines when they departed from normal practice or were 
in conflict with the operators’ concept of what was best for the client, or 
for their own agency. One of the planned variations in the Employment 
Opportunity Pilot Projects was a set of employment subsidies designed to 
encourage placement of AFDC recipients in private-sector jobs. It was 
only after this subexperiment was well underway that the DOL monitors 
discovered that the only clients being referred to the project from the 
welfare agency were the rejects and failures from WIN’s own placement 
activities. Needless to say, this had  a major  impact on the project’s 
placement rate-the  principal outcome measure-although  it did won- 
ders for WIN’s placement rate. 
The scale and visibility of  macroexperiments also makes them  ex- 
tremely vulnerable to a variety of  political pressures. The Minnesota 
Work Equity Project, for example, became embroiled in political con- 
troversy that delayed its implementation for nearly a year and had serious 
adverse effects on its ultimate design and implementation. The Employ- 
ment Opportunity Pilot Projects, with an annual budget of  $100 to $200 
million, was an obvious target for federal budget cutters throughout its 
brief life. In 1980, the project was seriously scaled back in midcourse as 
part of  President Carter’s budget-balancing effort, and in  1981 it was 
prematurely terminated  by  the  new  administration.  In contrast,  the 
Health Insurance Study, with an annual budget less than one-tenth as 
large, escaped the budget cutters’ ax on both occasions. 
A final limitation of  macroexperiments, not discussed by  Harris, is 
closely analogous to the selectivity  problem posed by voluntary participa- 
tion in macroexperiments. Participation in macroexperiments is, after 
all, also voluntary-both  at the site and individual levels. The experience 
with site selection for experiments and demonstrations is no more en- 
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Food Stamp Workfare Demonstrations, for example, a national solicita- 
tion netted a total of  seven volunteer sites-six  rural counties and one 
urban county where the food stamp caseload is allegedly heavily com- 
posed of  “beach bums.” In both the Health Insurance Study and the 
Employment  Opportunities  Pilot  Projects,  the  experimenters  first 
selected sites and then approached the local authorities, attempting to 
elicit  their  approval  and/or cooperation. In both  cases, exactly one- 
seventh of  the sites approached either refused or failed to cooperate to 
such a degree that a program was never initiated. 
The issue of individual participation and selectivity bias is somewhat 
more subtle in macroexperiments than in microexperiments, but no less 
real or important. In any intervention that relies for its effect on any 
positive action on the part of individuals, the extent of individual partic- 
ipation-whether  it be enrollment in a program, application for benefits, 
or simply response to a mass media educational campaign-will  be heav- 
ily dependent on the level of program outreach. The level and effective- 
ness of outreach efforts are exceedingly difficult to control in most cases, 
and the resulting participation rates can vary widely; I have seen partic- 
ipation rates anywhere from 1  or 2 percent to 40 or 50 percent in response 
to what appear to be comparable outreach efforts. The individuals who 
respond to outreach  directed  toward  the general  population  are, of 
course, just as self-selected as the randomly selected individuals who 
agree to participate in a microexperiment. Indeed, since participation 
rates are likely to be much lower in a macroexperiment, the potential for 
selectivity bias seems more serious. If  one had confidence that the ex- 
perimental outreach and participation would be replicated in a national 
program (or in another site), this potential bias would not be a problem, 
since the experimental outcomes would then be unbiased predictors of 
national-program outcomes. But that seems a heroic assumption, given 
the idiosyncratic nature  of  local outreach activities and  the extreme 
variation in resulting participation rates. 
While I do not believe that macroexperiments avoid the selectivity-bias 
problem, I do feel that one of  the advantages of  macroexperiments is 
their potential for measuring, if only crudely, participation rates. For the 
reasons  just  discussed, participation  rates in a macroexperiment  are 
likely to be an imprecise predictor of  national rates, but participation 
can’t be predicted at all from a microexperiment because the outreach 
method is highly artificial. And participation rates are a very important 
determinant of  program cost and/or effectiveness. 
Harris suggests several methodological approaches to mitigate the 
shortcomings of macroexperiments. I agree that steps could be taken to 
improve the methodological rigor of such projects. I am more skeptical 
than Harris, however, as to the practicality and likely effectiveness of 
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I heartily endorse, for example, the suggestion of random selection of 
treatment and comparison sites from matched pairs. I am much more 
dubious about the possibility of  “crossover and fold-back designs” in 
which the timing and sequence of program start-up and termination are 
“random and unknown to the experimental units.” In most cases projects 
like these require extensive prior negotiation and planning with local 
officials or agencies; it would often be virtually impossible-and  possibly 
unethical-to  keep such crucial information from the local personnel. 
On the other hand, Harris’s suggestion of  mixed macro and micro 
designs is quite appealing. In fact, the design of the Employment Oppor- 
tunity Pilot Projects included two microexperiments embedded within 
the overall macroexperiment.  Unfortunately, the results of  that effort 
were not entirely encouraging, largely because the microexperiments, 
like the macroexperiment itself, were administered by the regular pro- 
gram operators; the challenge of implementing random assignment and 
multiple treatments proved to be a difficult one for the program oper- 
ators. I have already described the problems encountered in  sample 
referral from WIN to the employment-subsidy experiment; the other 
experiment-within-the-experiment,  involving  alternative  job-search 
assistance techniques, had such difficulty establishing an effective out- 
reach effort that the results were virtually useless, and ultimately the 
experiment was abandoned. 
The suggestion that the results of  many independent rnacroexperi- 
ments could be combined is less appealing, even in principle. My office 
has just completed a survey of  about a dozen experiments and demon- 
strations in job-search assistance, all of which were modeled on a single, 
apparently successful, project. While we did not attempt any rigorous 
pooling of  data or results, it quickly became clear that the diversity of 
treatment design, data collection, outcome definition, and sample selec- 
tion in these projects almost defied description, let alone formal model- 
ing. I am doubtful that the task would be any easier in most other cases. 
Finally, Harris suggests that many of  the problems of  data collection 
could be avoided by using repeated cross-sectional surveys, rather than 
longitudinal surveys. While there is some validity to this suggestion, the 
precision of  the estimates of treatment effects could suffer substantially 
because of  individual variation.  Moreover, contrary to his  assertion, 
repeated cross sections might be much more expensive in many cases 
than longitudinal surveys. If  the population of  interest is a subset of  the 
general population (e.g., poor people, sick people, or program eligibles) 
a large number of  screening interviews may be required to identify each 
useful observation. In a longitudinal survey, this screening operation 
need only be performed once; in repeated cross sections it would have to 
be done for each successive wave. In the Employment Opportunity Pilot 
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random sample of the general population were required for each program 
eligible identified. 
Taking all of the strengths and weaknesses of both experimental modes 
into account, I would propose the following general criteria for deciding 
which experimental method is appropriate for a particular policy issue. 
1. Policy interest. If  the objective is to measure the overall efficacy of  a 
single program or small number of  programs, macroexperimentation 
may be more appropriate; if  the objective is to estimate behavioral 
responses to a wide range of program variants, microexperimentation 
is indicated. Policy interest in estimation of  participation rates also 
favors macroexperimentation. 
2. Nature of  the treatment. The nature of  the treatment will occasionally 
dictate one mode of experimentation. For example, educational cam- 
paigns that rely on mass media could not be implemented in a micro- 
experiment. On the other hand, treatments that require complicated 
explanations or interactions with participants-such  as “buying out” 
an existing health-insurance plan-may  be better implemented in a 
microexperiment. 
3. Nature of  the response. Macroexperimentation may be indicated if 
interactions among individuals in the group or community are thought 
to have an important effect on the response to the treatment. Purely 
individualistic responses can be measured in either mode of experi- 
ment. 
4. Administrative considerations. The scale and objectives of  macroex- 
periments will usually dictate that they be administered through ex- 
isting institutions and organizations. Careful thought must be given to 
whether that is possible in a experimental context. Span-of-control 
problems,  competing  institutional  objectives,  ingrained  organiza- 
tional behavior, and garden-variety start-up problems may seriously 
compromise implementation  of  the treatment  in  a short-duration 
experiment. On the other hand, microexperiments will be even more 
difficult  to run through existing institutions because of the multiplicity 
and  complexity of  treatments;  they will  usually  require  a  special 
administrative structure under the direct control of the experimenters. 
The degree to which this arrangement realistically replicates the ad- 
ministrative structure of  a permanent program, and how critical the 
difference is to the outcomes of  interest, must be carefully assessed. 
5. Statistical considerations. The estimates of treatment effect are likely 
to be more precise and unbiased in a microexperiment, because of the 
problems of cost, sample size, selectivity bias, administrative control, 
and lack of a true control group in macroexperiments. These potential 
disadvantages must be analyzed and weighed against whatever other 
factors favor macroexperimentation. 182  Jeffrey E. Harris 
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